Electronic Resource

On the Physical Security of Physically Unclonable Functions

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Penilaian

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This book investigates the susceptibility of intrinsic physically unclonable function (PUF) implementations on reconfigurable hardware to optical semi-invasive attacks from the chip backside. It explores different classes of optical attacks, particularly photonic emission analysis, laser fault injection, and optical contactless probing. By applying these techniques, the book demonstrates that the secrets generated by a PUF can be predicted, manipulated or directly probed without affecting the behavior of the PUF. It subsequently discusses the cost and feasibility of launching such attacks against the very latest hardware technologies in a real scenario. The author discusses why PUFs are not tamper-evident in their current configuration, and therefore, PUFs alone cannot raise the security level of key storage. The author then reviews the potential and already implemented countermeasures, which can remedy PUFs’ security-related shortcomings and make them resistant to optical side-channel and optical fault attacks. Lastly, by making selected modifications to the functionality of an existing PUF architecture, the book presents a prototype tamper-evident sensor for detecting optical contactless probing attempts.

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Availability

Inventory Code	Barcode	Call Number	Location	Status
1908002121	EB0002827	005.8 Taj o	Central Library (OPAC)	Available

Detail Information

Series Title

T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services

Call Number

005.8 Taj o

Publisher

Switzerland : Springer Cham., 2018

Collation

xx, 79p.:ill

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

978-3-319-75820-6

Classification

005.8

Content Type

Ebook

Media Type

-

Carrier Type

online resource

Edition

1

Subject(s)

Adaptive computing systems

Specific Detail Info

-

Statement of Responsibility

BRF

Other version/related

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